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FEDERAL EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ACT: POWER OF A STATE
COURT TO ENJOIN A SUIT BROUGHT UNDER THE ACT IN
A SISTER STATE
Pope v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry., 73 Sup. Ct. 749 (1953)
Petitioner, a Georgia resident, sued respondent in an Alabama
court for recovery for injuries suffered in Georgia during the course
of his employment by respondent. The action was brought under
the Federal Employers' Liability Act," which gives employees a choice
of jurisdictions in which to bring such a suit. Respondent sought an
injunction in a Georgia court enjoining petitioner from further
maintenance and prosecution of the Alabama suit. Employee's demurrer was sustained by the trial court. The Supreme Court of Georgia
reversed, and petitioner was granted certiorari by the United
States Supreme Court. HELD, a Georgia court has no authority to enjoin prosecution of a suit brought in an Alabama court under the
Federal Employers' Liability Act for injuries suffered in Georgia.
Judgment reversed, Justice Frankfurter dissenting.
It is a settled rule of law that the equity courts of one state can
restrain by injunction persons residing within the jurisdiction from
maintaining suits in the courts of another state.2 The courts do not
pretend to direct or control the foreign courts but bring their power
to bear solely upon the party whose action is enjoined.3 The restraint
is upon acts contrary to equity and good conscience which will result
in fraud or injustice to others, and the courts employ this power only
when necessary to prevent a manifest wrong.4
The Federal Employers' Liability Act provides that state and federal
courts shall have concurrent jurisdiction in actions brought thereunder. The venue requirements are established by the provision,
"Under this chapter an action may be brought in a district court of
the United States, in the district of the residence of the defendant,
or in which the cause of action arose, in which the defendant shall
be doing business at the time of commencing such action."
'85 STAT. 66 (1908), as amended, 62 STAT. 989 (1948), 45 U.S.C. §56 (Supp. 1952).
2
E.g., Oates v. Morningside College, 217 Iowa 1059, 252 N.W. 788 (1984);
Columbian Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Cross, 298 Mass. 47, 9 N.E.2d 402 (1937); New York,
Chicago & St. L. Ry. v. Matzinger, 186 Ohio St. 271, 25 N.E.2d 349 (1940).
3Royal League v. Kavanagh, 238 111. 175, 84 N.E. 178 (1908).
4Accord, Brinkerhoff v. Huntley, 223 111. App. 580 (1921); McWhorter v. WVilliams, 228 Ala. 632, 155 So. 309 (1934).
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Under this provision an injured employee can bring an action in
any state in which the employer is doing business, irrespective of
employee's residence or the place of the accident. This situation has
resulted in frequent litigation. Injured employees often bring suits
against their employers in distant courts, compelling the employers
to transport witnesses to the trial at considerable expense. Employers
have responded by seeking injunctive relief prohibiting the prosecution of these suits on the grounds of allegedly inequitable harassment
and vexation.5 Until Baltimore and Ohio Railway v. KepnerO was
decided in 1941 state courts frequently enjoined prosecution of such
suits. They interpreted the Federal Employers' Liability Act as indicating no intent of Congress to abolish or alter their right to regulate the conduct of their citizens by injunction in appropriate in7
stances.
In the Kepner case the United States Supreme Court held that
the act created a privilege of venue, granted by the legislative body
creating the right of action, which could not be frustrated for reasons
of convenience or expense. The power of state courts to enjoin a
suit brought under the act in a federal court was thus destroyed. A
year later, in Miles v. Illinois Central Railroad Co., the Court reiterated its denial of a state court's authority to enjoin such a suit
in the courts of a sister state. Mr. Justice Frankfurter wrote strong dissents in both cases. He found no clear intent on the part of Congress
to alter or abolish state court authority, and he stated that the wellrecognized power of injunction should not be destroyed by implication but only on the showing of a definite intent of Congress to do so.
Congress in 1948 adopted a revision of Title 28, United States Code,
Section 1404 (a) of which provides: "For the convenience of parties
and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a court may transfer any civil
action to any other district or division where it might have been
brought." The United States Supreme Court interpreted this section
in Ex parte Collett.9 The majority opinion held that a suit brought
under the Federal Employers' Liability Act in a federal court could
5

Baltimore 8&0. R.R. v. Clem, 36 F. Supp. 703 (D. W. Va. 1941); Baltimore &
0. R.R. v. Inlow, 64 Ohio App. 134, 28 N.E.2d 373 (1940); Louisville 9- N. R.R.
v. Ragan, 172 Tenn. 593, 113 S.W.2d 743 (1938).
6314 U.S. 44 (1941).
7Kern v. Cleveland, C.C. & St. L. Ry., 204 Ind. 595, 185 N.E. 446 (1933); Chicago,
M. & St. P. Ry. v. McGinley, 175 Wis. 565, 185 N.W. 218 (1922).
8315 U.S. 698 (1942).
0337 U.S. 55 (1949).
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be transferred to a more convenient forum even though the venue was
proper. This holding reinstated the doctrine of forum non conveniens
in suits brought under the act. The Court ruled that the section involved destroyed the right of an injured employee to have his suit
tried in any court wherein proper venue could be established. The
Court did not consider the problem of a state court's right to enjoin
its residents from bringing suits under the act in other states. That
issue was decided in the instant case.
The Supreme Court of Georgia held ° that the Collett case in effect
overruled the Miles and Kepner cases and re-established the authority
of the state courts as it existed prior to those rulings. The Georgia
court noted that the United States Supreme Court had recognized the
unfairness to employers resulting from those decisions but nevertheless
held that only Congress could grant relief. Such relief, the Georgia
court believed, was accorded by the revised federal code.
Speaking through Chief Justice Vinson, the United States Supreme
Court decided by an 8-1 majority that the Miles and Kepner cases
were not overruled by Section 1404 (a) as revised in 1948 but rather
were deliberately left intact by Congress. The section by its very
terms, said the Court, speaks only to federal courts; and it merely
authorizes them to transfer a transitory cause of action to a more
convenient forum. Since the section does not refer to state courts
and makes no provision for establishing proper venue by means of
a collateral suit in a foreign court, the Miles and Kepner decisions
were to be left undisturbed.
In a dissenting opinion" Mr. Justice Frankfurter contended that
it was the intention of Congress, if not its expressed purpose, to restore
the power of state courts to enjoin inequitable suits. He insisted
that Congress had established a policy intended to prevent abuses of
the Federal Employers' Liability Act and that to construe the statute
so as to disregard its natural implications constituted the cardinal sin
of statutory construction - blind literalness.
The dissent also pointed out what is perhaps the most objectionable
result of the majority holding. A minority of states, including Alabama, refuse to accept the doctrine of forum non conveniens; and
many others have neither accepted nor rejected it.12 This results in
10209 Ga. 187, 71 S.E.2d 243 (1952). Contra: Atlantic C.L. Ry. v. Wood, 58 So.2d
549 (Fla. 1952).
LAt p. 753.
12For a full discussion of this subject see Barrett, The Doctrine of Forum Non
Conveniens, 35 CALIF. L. REv. 380 (1947).
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an anomaly in the law. If an injured employee brings an inequitable
transitory suit in a federal court or in a state court which recognizes
the doctrine of forum non conveniens, the court may transfer the
suit to a more convenient forum. But if the employee sues in a state
which rejects the doctrine there is no way to prevent a harassing and
vexatious suit against the employer. This Congress has condemned.
The result effected by the majority holding seems unfortunate, for
it increases lack of uniformity in the law and conflicts with traditional
concepts of state court authority. But the Court has spoken clearly
and decisively, and the issue is now settled unless Congress should
restore to the state courts by statute the power which they need in
order to insure that justice be done.
W. RAYMOND FoRaTNR
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